Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy: The Beginning of an Argument and Some Modest Predictions by Fairfax, Sally K. et al.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy 
(Summer Conference, June 6-8) 2007 
6-6-2007 
Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources Law and 
Policy: The Beginning of an Argument and Some Modest 
Predictions 
Sally K. Fairfax 
Helen Ingram 
Leigh Raymond 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/future-of-natural-resources-law-and-
policy 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, Biodiversity Commons, Climate 
Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Environmental Law Commons, 
Environmental Policy Commons, Forest Management Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Land Use Law 
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Education Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Commons, Litigation Commons, Natural Resource Economics Commons, Natural 
Resources and Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources 
Management and Policy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, 
Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, Property Law and 
Real Estate Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, State and Local Government Law 
Commons, Sustainability Commons, Torts Commons, Urban Studies and Planning Commons, Water Law 
Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons 
Citation Information 
Fairfax, Sally K.; Ingram, Helen; and Raymond, Leigh, "Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources 
Law and Policy: The Beginning of an Argument and Some Modest Predictions" (2007). The Future of 
Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8). 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/future-of-natural-resources-law-and-policy/20 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 





Sally K. Fairfax, Helen Ingram & Leigh Raymond, 
Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources 
Law and Policy: The Beginning of An Argument and 
Some Modest Proposals, in THE FUTURE OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. 
of Colo. Law Sch. 2007). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
Historical Evolution and Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy:   
The Beginning of An Argument And Some Modest Predictions 
 
Sally K. Fairfax, Helen Ingram, and Leigh Raymond 
 
The purpose of this paper is to locate the evolution of natural resource law and policy 
within the larger evolution of Americans’ understanding of government and property; and 
to use the trajectory of that evolution to suggest some likely patterns of future 
developments. In this discussion we follow closely the role of science and property in the 
centralization of control over land and water.   
 
I. The Trajectory in Six Eras 
 
1.  The First Hundred Years 
 
The Articles of Confederation--Limits on its powers did not stop the Confederated 
Congress from taking initial steps toward establishing the Army Corps of Engineers, or 
deter the Congress from adopting a series of General Land Ordinances1 in 1785 and 1787 
domain.   
  
Property rights of the era were grounded in the ideas of John Locke:  ownership was 
frequently defended based on individual labor and frequently conceived of in relation to 
concrete, material objects – in particular, to land.2  The vision of property as a highly 
divisible “bundle of sticks” with separable rights moving among multiple owners would 
not arrive for another 100 years.3   In the humid eastern colonies, property rights in water 
were tied to ownership of the land, a right to reasonable use of whatever flowed past or 
fell from the sky.4  Similarly, management was closely tied to ownership:  what the man 
and his slaves or workers did on the man’s farm.   
 
The Federal Constitution--The Constitution created small concrete steps toward and 
enormous potential for centralization.  It recognized the federal government’s right to 
own and manage western territories, albeit temporarily.  The federal government’s role 
was originally understood as limited to the rights of a “mere proprietor,”5 plus the 
responsibility for the “primary disposal of the soil,” to assure the orderly development of 
1 Once you have read Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968), especially Chapters 1 and 3, 
the best sources are from the acts’ bicentennial period:  Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union:  A History of 
the Northwest Ordinance (1986); Robert M. Taylor, Jr., The Northwest Ordinance 1787:  A Bicentennial 
Handbook (1987), and John J. Patrick, Lessons on  the Northwest Ordinance (1986).   
2 William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the 
Twentieth Century (1977); R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American 
Political Theory, 1890-1920 (1982). 
3 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992); Eric T. Freyfogle, The 
Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 77 (1995) 
4 Riparian doctrine was not all that simple but the basics were familiar and imported from England.  But 
see, regarding more arid, Spanish colonies of the same general period, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera. To Defend 
Our Water with the Blood of Our Veins: The Struggle for Resources in Colonial Puebla (1999).  .   
5 Cowart and Fairfax. “Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and Administrative Reality," 15 Ecology 
Law Quarterly 375 (1988) 
                                                 
the western territories.  That is, in Article I, Congress was authorized to make all rules 
regarding to whom and on what terms the public domain would pass into state or private 
ownership. The federal government as primary disposer began rather free handedly and 
remained that way well into the 20th century.  
 
On the other side of the land coin, government authority over private property was 
limited in part by the Fifth Amendment. Until the late 19th century, the dominant Fifth 
Amendment issue related to the justness of compensation:  the courts weighed “givings” 
against takings to assess a transaction’s “just-ness.”6  
 
Surprising, perhaps, since the Constitution does not mention water, Congress early on 
took a more activist role regarding early water policy.  Water management was rooted in 
science long before George Perkins Marsh and the Progressive era.  The Corps of 
Engineers was the only formally trained body of scientists in the new republic.  Further, 
the as part of the nation's small army, the Corps was available to serve the wishes of 
Congress and the executive branch.7 Enthusiasm for federal subsidies was a very early 
pattern in natural resource law and policy:  politicians wanted the Corps to undertake 
both military construction and works “of a civil nature."8  Familiar elements of the 
ACE’s current profile were carved in stone by the 1824 Supreme Court ruling in Gibbons 
v. Ogden.  Centralization, scientization and subsidies were early defined by water policy.   
2.  Post- Civil War—Industrialization, Expansion, and the Corporation 
 
American’s points of reference for life changed radically,9 and expectations of 
government changed accordingly.  Well-organized and diverse private interests followed 
the ACE model and lobbied Congress for programs that would meet their priorities.  
 
As the 19th century closed, federal authority over public land expanded under a more 
expansive reading of the ambiguous Article I property clause combined with the federal 
government’s equally ambiguous Article IV power of “exclusive legislation” over forts, 
6 See for starters, the ubiquitous but controversial Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Giving and 
Taking of Property (Forthcoming 2007).  See also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The 
Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum. L. Rev. (Forthcoming); Taking Compensation Private, 59 Stan. L. 
Rev. (Forthcoming).  Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale L. J. 72 (2005); A Theory of Property, 90 
Cornell L. Rev. 531 (2005); Of Property and Anti-Property, 102 Mich.L. Rev. 1 (2004); Not Just 
Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29 (2003); Givings, 111 Yale L. J. 547 (2001). 
7 The Corps history is adapted, cut and pasted from http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/beg last visited 
April 8. 2007. 
8 The Corps history is adapted, cut and pasted from http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/beg last visited 
April 8. 2007. 
9 A good general source is LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990’S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce Yandle ed. 
1995), especially Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement:  How it Began and Where it is 
Headed 1-30.  See also N. Ehrenreich, A Trend?: The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1235 (1996).  
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arsenals and similar land acquired by the government for specific purposes.10 The federal 
government morphed from a mere proprietor to a proprietor plus to a sovereign in a series 
of court cases starting with Camfield in 1897.11  Acquisition of land by the federal 
government for similar purposes was soon to follow.12 
 
3. The Progressive Era13 
 
The transformative power of the railroads gave rise to new ways of organizing capital 
flows, natural resource consumption, industrial management, and property. 
Progressive activists relied on the idea of scientific management to expand government 
agencies like the Forest Service14 and the Reclamation Service and to consolidate their 
control over vast portions of the federal estate.15 The imported and putatively scientific 
field of forestry gave legitimacy to some centralization, [Light (1911)16 and Grimaud 
(1911)17] even during the Supreme Court’s Lochner era efforts to stem the rising tide of 
unscientific social regulation.18  
 
Federal subsidies of water development and irrigation intensified. Yet the apparently 
centralizing era is complicated by the fact that the federal reclamation crusade soon had 
to relinquish control to compromise with water users. 19 Similarly, the apparent severance 
of the federal property owner’s riparian water rights from the public domain lands made 
room for the ascendancy of state administered prior appropriation systems to replace 
riparian rights in most western jurisdictions. 20   
 
Underwriting these complex developments was an equally complexifying notion of 
property, which morphed from its Lockean roots to permit both federal initiatives and 
10 Discussed, with appropriate brevity in L. Raymond and S. K. Fairfax. Fragmentation of Public Domain 
Law and Policy: An Alternative  to the ‘Shift to Retention’ Thesis.  39 Natural Resources Journal 649-753 
(1999).  See also, Fairfax, et al, Buying Nature, at    .  
  and will  less brevity in the materials cited therein.  Originally the federal government was not viewed as 
having the power of eminent domain within states.  The states acquired what lands the feds needed within 
their boundaries and donated it to the central government.  That changed in 1888.   
11 Camfield v. U. S., 167 U.S. 518 (1897) 
12 Fairfax et al., Buying Nature at ____ (2005). 
13 For our basic view of the progressive era, see L. Raymond and S. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public 
Domain Law and Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649 (1999), at 656-660 and references cited therein.  See 
also, SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY (1959) and ROBERT H. WIEBE, 
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967).  
14 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency (1999). 
15 Raymond and Fairfax, supra at 669-671.  For more detailed treatments, see James Q. Wilson, The Rise of 
the Bureaucratic State, 41 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 77 (1975), or STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE:  THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982). 
16 Light v. US, 220 US 523 (1911) 
17 U S v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
18 The legislative fall out from The Octopus and the rise of the US Forest Service may have passed judicial 
scrutiny because they were scientific.  Just a hypothesis.   
19 According to Karen Smith, excessive costs resulted for the Federal government because there were not 
adequate numbers of settlers to occupy the newly irrigated lands in Nevada. The Magnificent Experiment: 
Building the Salt River Project, 1880-1917. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986. 
20 Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters (1983).   
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corporate expansion. Modern corporations pushed the law to recognize a growing 
division of labor between owners (the shareholders), who held the right to a company’s 
revenue, and managers who exercised primary control over the day-to-day operation of 
the company.  
 
Supreme Court decisions giving private entrepreneurs something close to ownership of “a 
particular legal environment” considerably expanded the scope of private property 
beyond land and material goods.21  Populist and progressive reformers alike contested 
many of these changes.22 Ironically, the courts also thwarted the corporate grasp on the 
Chicago waterfront,23 and invented a federal quasi-appropriative water right to bolster 
federal land reservations for Native Americans. 
 
4.  The Depression 
 
The Depression can be understood as the ultimate flowering of progressive era ideas:24 
the Progressive era’s centralization and faith in scientific expertise peaked as the feds 
moved front and center in natural resource, water, and land use planning.  Agricultural 
relief programs allowed the federal government assumed the right to adjust almost any 
ownership pattern what was not socially and economically optimal, Lockean property 
rights bottomed out.25 
  
But the Taylor Grazing Act26 underscores that this Progressive era overlay on a 
profoundly Lockean tradition of property, not an about face but a complication of 
ownership. To illustrate, under the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act, the newly created Division 
of Grazing was very keen to continue recognizing Lockean based claims to control over 
the public domain, as mitigated by important egalitarian and subsistence considerations.  
 
 
4. The Environmental Era  
 
Depression Era enthusiasm for centralized government science lasted through the first 
heady days of the 1970s and then petered out as science complexified as a source of 
government authority.  Environmentalists generally followed the established path to 
Washington to address the growing concerns with air and water quality.  But 
21 Morton Horowitz.  The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 
(1992).  
22 Indeed, it is fair to observe that the federal and state legislatures were encouraged by progressive 
reformers and discouraged by the Supreme Court regarding regulation of the expansive economy in what is 
now somewhat controversially called the Lochner Era.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987).  But compare the conservative reposte, for example, Bernstein, David E., 
"Lochner's Legacy's Legacy" . George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-15 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=394861 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.394861 
23 Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois , 146 U.S. 387 (1892) 
24 The standard conceptualization is either that FDR completed TR’s mission (Swain) or displaced it with a 
new vision (Schlesinger).   
25 Buying Nature, discussing Wooton.  This was virtually always to the advantage of the owners however,  
See the discussion of the Weeks Act and its Depression Era expansion, supra. 
26 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316o, June 28, 1934, 
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simultaneously, they challenged government science in wilderness debates, grazing 
debates, the clear cutting controversy and ever more generally.  
 
With astonishing speed, the federal government passed one major statue after another in 
the post-Earth Day fervor of the era, dramatically enhancing central authority over many 
aspects of our lives.  Suddenly, scientific experts at the newly constituted Environmental 
Protection Agency were charged with setting acceptable levels of air and water pollution 
without regard to cost or industry concern.  
 
Yet, the public lands agencies found themselves embroiled in public controversy over the 
recreational and increasingly ecological effects of standard management practices.  The 
National Forest Management Act27 (NFMA), the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act28 (FLPMA) imposed a complex, comprehensive, long-term resource assessment on 
federal managers.  The planning mandated public involvement and opened the agencies 
to public scrutiny.29  An energized judicial reading of the APA30 and NEPA subjected all 
federal agencies to intense public and judicial scrutiny as scientific bureaucracy gave 
way. 
 
And, yet again, the limits of environmental movement became clear when Jimmy Carter 
had to rescind his plan for cutting funding for eighteen ongoing water projects.  However, 
more arduous economic and environmental reviews were instituted, and a precedent of 
“no new starts” of additional projects was established in 1981, although the Corps did 
continue to get money for “preauthorization studies”31. The tougher standards of 
evaluation along with the fact that most good dam sites had already been used suggested 
that the era of big days was over. 
 
6.  The Regan Revolution 
 
Regan and his successors moved into this growing complexity by exalting markets and 
private property and discouraging confidence in government action and regulation. While 
Reagan failed to dismantle the federal regulatory infrastructure of the 1970s, his efforts 
undermined its credibility. The tuna-porpoise debates at the WTO suggested, moreover, 
that perhaps it did not matter what Congress said.32  
27 6 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614, August 17, 1974, as amended 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988 and 
1990. 
28   43 U.S. C. §35.  Described from the Bureau of Land Management’s perspective in The Federal  Land 
Policy and Management Act as Amended available at http://www.blm.gov/flpma/FLPMA.pdf 
29 Achterman, G.L. and S.K. Fairfax. The Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act. 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1979).  
30 See generally, Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667, 1682-83, 1713-15 (1975).  See also, Scenic Hudson v FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).  
31 Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel C McCool, Staking Out the Terrain: Power and Performance Among 
Natural Resources Agencies ,Albany: Statue University of New York Press, 1996. 
32 Perrin, William F., CHRONOLOGICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF  
THE TUNA-DOLPHIN PROBLEM, 1941-2001. NOAA Technical Memorandum NOAA-NMFS-SWFSC-
356, 194pp. (2004)  
.  Available on the web at 
http://swfsc.noaa.gov/uploadedFiles/Divisions/PRD/Programs/ETP_Cetacean_Assessment/TPBiblio.pdf .  
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Not helping matters any was a growing sense of concern over whether federal scientists 
were really as non-partisan or as competent as we all had hoped.33  Spurred by early 
skeptics like Ashley Schiff,34 critics of the public land agencies increasingly wondered if 
the federal scientists had the right ideas on basic issues like fire management to species 
conservation to pesticide use.  Ever more prominent and more intense conflicts over good 
versus “junk” science helped to further weaken public faith in scientific experts at the 
federal level and otherwise.35   
 
But a large part of the conversation had moved to regulation on private lands: a series of 
modest Fifth Amendment victories36 encouraged more market-based alternatives to 
conservation increasingly being promoted by free market thinkers of the period.37  
Land trusts touted “private” land conservation without government acquisition or 
regulation.38  Common rights in resources were routinely marketized:  environmental 
groups have paid ranchers for livestock killed by endangered wolves, for example, and 
have tried to bid on grazing permits and timber sales as conservation buyers.39 Others 
have bitterly resisted this ongoing “commodification” of nature.40  
 
Rumors of the demise of public regulation over private land were exaggerated.  
Nevertheless, the reluctance to use the full force of the federal regulatory hammer, 
especially on private lands, was increasingly palpable and the search for more 
collaborative, and creative, alternatives to increasingly intractable conflicts was 
growing.41 
 
The final result, as our story nears the present, is complexity.  Hundreds of local groups 
organized around watersheds have tried, with uneven success, to manage their mixtures 
of federal and/or private lands better than commodity users or federal managers could do 
alone.42  Some have firmly excluded the feds from the process (e.g. the Quincy Library 
Group), while others have included them closely (The Land Trust Alliance) but they are 
all searching for more collaborative, less confrontational ways to manage natural 
resources that span various institutional boundaries.43  And, despite the best efforts of 
conservative politicians and their allies, there has been no swing back to a happier time of 
33 Herbert Kaufmann, “Revolutions in the Doctrine of Public Administration.”  APSR 1954.   
34 Ashley Schiff, Fire and Water:  Scientific Heresy in the U.S. Forest Service.  (1962) 
35 See Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States 1955-
1985 (2004) 
36 A limerick on the subject would have to include First English, Lucas, Dolan, and Nolan. 
37 Anderson and Leal, FME.   
38 Raymond and Fairfax (2002) supra. 
39 Sally K. Fairfax and Andrea Issod, “Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform: Learning from Four 
State Cases.”  33 Environmental Law (2003).    
40 For a nice sample of this, see Timothy Luke, Ecocritique (1997), especially chapter 3 on The Nature 
Conservancy.  
41 Oliver Houck, (1993); DeWitt John, Civic Environmentalism (1994), Craig Thomas, Bureaucratic 
Landscapes (2003) on NCCP example of all this. 
42 Douglas Kenney here?  
43 Fairfax et al. (2005) penultimate chapter (thinking of that park in DC if you want to riff here Sally – or 
Whidbey up in Washington?) 
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private rights ascendant.  There has been instead a profusion of actors, and arrangements, 
and institutions resulting in growing mosaics of conservation and use on the ground. 
 
Part III.  The Next 50 Years:  Where Does our Trajectory Take Us 
 
1.  Review:  So Where Are We Now, Approximately?   
 
a.  Goals of Natural Resources Law and Policy 
 
Government and public goals have varied enormously during our trajectory.  However, 
since the very first, private and then corporate quest for profit has never varied.  Neither 
has the basic policy tool: subsidies—in the form of give aways or regulations that burden 
the opposition have dominated policy.    
 
b.  Science and Natural Resource Policy 
 
The government science that justified a growing federal role has departed the field. 
Science is now recognized as plural, uncertain, and branded by the contexts in which it is 
produced. 44  The result is more complexity. 
 
c.  Property 
 
After years of embracing markets and “blurring” the distinction between public and 
private property, policy entrepreneurs are now talking actively about the National or 
Global Commons being owned equally by citizens of a given state or the world.45  This 
“intrinsic” right to natural resources based simply on equal human rights is ironically but 
substantially Lockean.46  Also ironic is the fact that such ideas could usher in an era of 
stronger asserted public control over natural resources like public lands and water, rather 
than weaker, even as public institutions implement those controls through market-based 
mechanisms. 
 
IV.  Where Do These Trajectories Take Us 
 
Global climate change will impose new priorities on government that will further erode 
public confidence in political processes:   resources will be managed to prevent the 
disasters, flood, fire, intense storms, coastal inundation and inadequate potable water.   
 
This new goal set will further discredit political decision making that is already under 
assault from incompetence, corruption, dishonesty and public recognition of all of those 
things.  
 
44 The Data Quality Act snuck through Congress as Sec. 515 of the Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act for 2001 (Public Law 106-554).  It names a problem that it solves  
45 Barnes (2001) 
46 Climate change: see Agarwal and Narain (1991), Shue (1993); minerals, see Raymond (2007); water, see 
New Yorker article on Bechtel in Bolivia (get cite) 
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The comprehensive long range planning, ecosystem management, sustainability, and 
other slogans of the late 20th century government resource programs will fall of their own 
weight:  we simply cannot afford the science required or the monitoring that ostensibly 
follows.  The era of strong, centralized, scientific government control of public resources 
is ending, being replaced in part by an era of markets. 
 
We anticipate that the dominant resource problem, the one that will shape institutions will 
be a growing crisis in water availability.  As this arena becomes increasingly marketized, 
science will provide less succor for advocates of public decision making.  
 
That is not to say that science will disappear as an element of decision making.  Although 
science wars were once thought to discredit all science, increasing controversy has 
appeared to democratize science so that citizen scientists collect their own data and do 
their own monitoring.  Science is no longer a trump card, but one will still have to have 
some to have a winning hand.  
 
Government agencies will not, typically, hold that hand.  Instead, the epicenter of 21st 
century resource policy and management will be a combination of private property and 
the new property described half a century ago by Charles Reich:  The right to or ability to 
generate government largesse.  It is an overstatement to assert that government will 
continue to have influence because those who benefit from subsidies will have to cede it 
enough authority to continue raising and collecting taxes but that will be a large part of it. 
On the other hand, a small but growing trend toward greater collective ownership of 
public resources, often expressed through quasi market-based institutions like the “sky 
trust,” shows another, more populist and egalitarian side to this ongoing transformation of 
public resource management.  To what degree these “new” property rights will be 
traditional subsidies to powerful interests or more egalitarian forms of common 
ownership remains a vital unanswered question.  
 
Given the past 200 years of history, however, it is hard to be optimistic. In this sense, it 
seems likely that the political discourse and government priorities for resource 
management in general and water in particular will recede in importance. Thus, we wager 
on “more of the same” and perhaps much more in the critical area of water policy.  As 
sea levels rise and extreme weather events become more common, there will be intense 
pressure to return to the construction of dams and levees, even though many agree that 
such projects do not provide solutions.  
 
It seems unlikely that recently installed public participatory mechanisms will be 
dismantled, but the water resources community has a long history of fashioning 
multipurpose projects that have something in them that is attractive to nearly every 
constituency. More generally, natural resources governance will increasingly become 
network activity that associates private property owners, primarily global corporations, in 
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